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2017-01-03 21:33:01 | Dear Obama, From Infosec (lien direct) | Dear President Obama:We are more than willing to believe Russia was responsible for the hacked emails/records that influenced our election. We believe Russian hackers were involved. Even if these hackers weren't under the direct command of Putin, we know he could put a stop to such hacking if he chose. It's like harassment of journalists and diplomats. Putin encourages a culture of thuggery that attacks opposition, without his personal direction, but with his tacit approval.Your lame attempts to convince us of what we already agree with has irretrievably damaged your message.Instead of communicating with the America people, you worked through your typical system of propaganda, such as stories in the New York Times quoting unnamed "senior government officials". We don't want "unnamed" officials -- we want named officials (namely you) who we can pin down and question. When you work through this system of official leaks, we believe you have something to hide, that the evidence won't stand on its own.We still don't believe the CIA's conclusions because we don't know, precisely, what those conclusions are. Are they derived purely from companies like FireEye and CloudStrike based on digital forensics? Or do you have spies in Russian hacker communities that give better information? This is such an important issue that it's worth degrading sources of information in order to tell us, the American public, the truth.You had the DHS and US-CERT issue the "GRIZZLY-STEPPE" report "attributing those compromises to Russian malicious cyber activity". It does nothing of the sort. It's full of garbage. It contains signatures of viruses that are publicly available, used by hackers around the world, not just Russia. It contains a long list of IP addresses from perfectly normal services, like Tor, Google, Dropbox, Yahoo, and so forth.Yes, hackers use Yahoo for phishing and malvertising. It doesn't mean every access of Yahoo is an "Indicator of Compromise".For example, I checked my web browser [chrome://net-internals/#dns] and found that last year on November 20th, it accessed two IP addresses that are on the Grizzley-Steppe list: No, this doesn't mean I've been hacked. It means I just had a normal interaction with Yahoo. It means the Grizzley-Steppe IoCs are garbage.If your intent was to show technical information to experts to confirm Russia's involvement, you've done the precise opposite. Grizzley-Steppe proves such enormous incompetence that we doubt all the technical details you might have. I mean, it's possible that you classified the important details and de-classified the junk, but even then, that junk isn't worth publishing. There's no excuse for those Yahoo addresses to be in there, or the numerous other problems.Among the consequences is that Washington Post story claiming Russians hacked into the Vermont power grid. What really happened is that somebody just checked their Yahoo email, thereby accessing one of the same IP addresses I did. How they get from the facts (one person accessed Yahoo email) to the story (Russians hacked power grid) is your responsibility. This misinformation is your fault.You announced sanctions for the Russian hacking [*]. At the same time, you announced sanctions for Russian harassment of diplomati |
Yahoo APT 29 APT 28 | ||
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2016-12-29 20:40:33 | Some notes on IoCs (lien direct) | Obama "sanctioned" Russia today for those DNC/election hacks, kicking out 35 diplomats, closing diplomatic compounds, seizing assets of named individuals/groups. They also published "IoCs" of those attacks, fingerprints/signatures that point back to the attackers, like virus patterns, file hashes, and IP addresses.These IoCs are of low quality. They are published as a political tool, to prove they have evidence pointing to Russia. They have limited utility to defenders, or those publicly analyzing attacks.Consider the Yara rule included in US-CERT's "GRIZZLY STEPPE" announcement: What is this? What does this mean? What do I do with this information?It's a YARA rule. YARA is a tool ostensibly for malware researchers, to quickly classify files. It's not really an anti-virus product designed to prevent or detect an intrusion/infection, but to analyze an intrusion/infection afterward -- such as attributing the attack. Signatures like this will identify a well-known file found on infected/hacked systems.What this YARA rule detects is, as the name suggests, the "PAS TOOL WEB KIT", a web shell tool that's popular among Russia/Ukraine hackers. If you google "PAS TOOL PHP WEB KIT", the second result points to the tool in question. You can download a copy here [*], or you can view it on GitHub here [*].Once a hacker gets comfortable with a tool, they tend to keep using it. That implies the YARA rule is useful at tracking the activity of that hacker, to see which other attacks they've been involved in, since it will find the same web shell on all the victims.The problem is that this P.A.S. web shell is popular, used by hundreds if not thousands of hackers, mostly associated with Russia, but also throughout the rest of the world (judging by hacker forum posts). This makes using the YARA signature for attribution problematic: just because you found P.A.S. in two different places doesn't mean it's the same hacker.A web shell, by the way, is one of the most common things hackers use once they've broken into a server. It allows further hacking and exfiltration traffic to appear as normal web requests. It typically consists of a script file (PHP, ASP, PERL, etc.) that forwards commands to the local system. There are hundreds of popular web shells in use.We have little visibility into how the government used these IoCs. IP addresses and YARA rules like this are weak, insufficient for attribution by themselves. On the other hand, if they've got web server logs from multiple victims where commands from those IP addresses went to this specific web shell, then the attribution would be strong that all these attacks are by the same actor.In other words, these rules can be a reflection of the fact the government has excellent information for attribution. Or, it could be a reflection that they've got only weak bits and pieces. It's impossible for us outsiders to tell. IoCs/signatures are fetishized in the cybersecurity community: they love the small rule, but they ignore the complexity and context around the rules, often misunderstanding what's going on. (I've written thousands of the things -- I'm constantly annoyed by the ignorance among those not understanding what they mean).I see on |
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